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Chapter 1- The Crisis
Introduction
	
  
"If a modern Diogenes were to hunt out for Indians with his lantern in these days, he
would be sure to come across fervid Hindus, bigoted Muslims and fanatical souls deeply
engrossed with the problem of tirelessly finding out how unjustly their own particular
community was being treated, and he would have to ask in sorrow: 'Where are the
Indians?' "
- Syed Abdullah Brelvi. 1
Assessment of Indian Democracy: Indian Civilization’s Problem
	
  
When India gained independence in 1947, it consisted of 550 independent states
with 350 million people who spoke more than two-dozen different languages and who
had a myriad of religious affiliations. Due to this exceptional diversity many observers
doubted India’s ability to survive as one political nation state. The odds against
establishing a stable political state were further compounded by the ravage massacre of
the partition that killed a million people, displaced another 13 million people and resulted
in economic losses of billions of rupees. It seemed that an attempt at an Indian union
would fail and that the subcontinent would disintegrate into many states.
However, when it comes to political unity, Indian democracy has not only
survived, but it has flourished. India has managed to consistently conduct fair elections of
gigantic proportions. At present India is in the middle of conducting the largest
democratic exercise in history, where 815 million people are eligible to vote, a number
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  Guha, Ramchandra . "The Good Indian." The Hindu 15 Feb. 2009: n. pag. Print.	
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bigger than the entire population of Europe. India has also had very limited issues with
the transfer of power between leaders. This is especially commendable considering how
many countries formed in the post colonial period have consistently had issues with
military coups and the establishment of functioning democracies. A prime example of
this is India’s volatile neighbor, Pakistan that was carved out of the former British India
at the same time as India. Pakistan has been under military rule for 32 years of its 67
years of independence, facing constant tensions between the military and the civil
government. While in India a culture of democracy has flourished, in Pakistan democracy
has remained stillborn. Furthermore even the threats that Indian democracy has faced,
especially during the time of Emergency in the 1970s, have been decisively defeated by
the Indian voter. By ensuring the freedom of press, granting basic civil liberties and
establishing institutions that check power, Indian has sustained a democracy that
maintains its political unity and provides to a certain degree freedom of mind to its
people.
There is, however one major issue that is starting to gravely undermine Indian
democracy despite its reasonable success. This problem is not new; rather it stems from
India’s inherent social diversity. In-fact as Tagore points out the main issue of Indian
civilization from the beginning of her history is not political but social in nature; it’s the
race problem. India has been the melting pot for diverse ethnicities for centuries. From
the conquering Aryans to the local Dravidians, from the warring Greeks to the trading
Jews, from the victorious Mughals to the refuge-seeking Parsi-Zoroastrians, India has
provided its material riches and spiritual solace to all. Numerous foreign invasions and
India’s central role in world trade, has brought it in touch with different races. All these
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factors have made it pertinent for India to embark on a quest to understand how people
with different social, religious and cultural practices can live together. This is unlike the
West, where people were able to segregate into different ethnic groups, eventually
forming different Nation-States with unique central identities for their citizens. Therefore
European history became more about political identity, about the rise and fall of
kingdoms, about fights for political freedom and supremacy. India’s history, on the other
hand, has been the story of continual social adjustment. As Tagore puts it, “her (India’s)
mission has been like that of a hostess to provide proper accommodation to her numerous
guests whose habits and requirements are different from one another. It is giving rise to
infinite complexities whose solution depends not merely upon tactfulness but sympathy
and true realization of the unity of man” (Tagore 4). 	
  
While India made some strides through social recognition of differences and
through spiritual recognition of unity, it was not able to completely address its race
problem. In-fact it even exacerbated the problem by creating rigid social institutions that
made intellectual development stagnant, making India ripe for economic exploitation
through colonialism. Even in 1947, when India got its political independence from the
British, this problem was a major cause for concern. It was the reason why the world
thought that India could not survive as a modern nation-state. While fortunately India not
only survived but also to a certain degree thrived as a nation-state, it has still after 67
years of independence, been unable to solve this problem inherent in the Indian
civilization. Indian democracy, despite its best intentions, has been unable to provide an
effective common political platform that is equally accessible to various communities: a
platform that is fundamental to the fair workings of a modern democratic nation-state.
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This inability to provide a common political platform has led to an undercurrent of social
unrest and disharmony. While social unrest has been a constant feature of the Indian
polity since independence, recent Indian political history has made the problem more
lethal. It now has the potential of gravely undermining India’s political stability and
causing it to disintegrate into various hostile fragments, just like the world predicted in
1947. The reason why India’s social problem has taken almost 70 years to become a
potential threat again, is because of two main reasons: the disappearance of certain
political platforms that briefly united India’s diverse communities and the onset of free
market capitalism that has resulted in stronger regional and religious associations that are
harmful to the larger national identity.

India’s Short Lived Political Identities
	
  
One reason why India’s race problem has not been resolved and has made a
strong reappearance is India’s short lived political identities. The political platforms that
united India for a long time were unsustainable in the long run and never directly
addressed India’s deep-rooted social problems. They just diverted attention by grounding
themselves on external political factors and entities. For a long time, during and after
independence, Indians based their political identity in contrast to an external political
entity. During the independence movement when the Indians united to fight against the
yoke of foreign oppression, their national political platform was Anti-British or AntiColonialism. This remained the prevalent Indian political identity briefly after
independence, slowly diminishing in importance but always remaining a constant
underlying basis on which Indians first established their nation-state. In-fact to a certain
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degree it facilitated India’s political and social ideology for the next few decades.
Ideologically India aligned itself with socialist Soviet Union, basing its political platform
on being Anti-West and Anti-Capitalism. Perhaps though, the political platform that truly
united India for decades was based on the rivalry with its contrasting neighbor, Pakistan.
From the onset of the bloody creation of the two states to the numerous territorial
disputes that have resulted in four full-scaled wars, India and Pakistan’s relationship has
been full of animosity and suspicion of the other side. Ideologically, the two nations were
established to juxtapose each other, to provide separate national identities for its majority
population. The two-nation theory was based on the idea that Hindus and Muslims were
separate nationalities, that a Hindu majority India would not be a safe place for the
Muslims and therefore Muslims needed a separate nation to contrast a Hindu-nation. This
ideological creation itself pitted the neighbors against each other, leading them to join
separate political camps. Despite the cultural similarities and the common historical
heritage, Pakistan and India took two very different paths to the creation and functioning
of their respective nation-states, often engaging in military and ideological confrontation.
This allowed Indians to base their national identity in contrast to that of Pakistan: Indians
united by being Anti-Pakistan.
In-spite their relative strength and efficacy, these common political platforms
have been unsustainable due to their dependence on external factors. The external
environment is susceptible to constant change, which would require a constant renovation
of the common national identity, making the whole process cumbersome and ineffective
in the long run. A nation-state cannot hope to survive if its existence and the identity of
its people are derived from a source that it has no control over. This issue is clearly
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evident in the India of today. Over the past few decades, India’s association with the
world has evolved. In 1991 India opened its markets and slowly started adopting
capitalism. Over the next two decades, India’s economic growth and its status as the
world’s largest democracy propelled the nation to the world’s center stage. Soon the
distrustful relationship with the West turned into a more strategic economic partnership.
India started embracing Western culture and economic ideology: it stopped being AntiWest. In the same period, as India found its niche in the larger world stage, its
relationship with Pakistan became less confrontational. There were still disputes
regarding state-sponsored terrorism and territorial access, but due to the nuclear
armament of both nations, these disputes did not escalate into full-scale war. Furthermore
while India was being proclaimed as the new 21st century super-power, Pakistan was
involved in its own internal conflicts that crippled its economy and its government,
urging many observers to label it as a fail state. This drastic change in fortunes has made
Indians view their erratic neighbor differently. For India it is no longer about competing
with Pakistan, but just being cautious about its state and non-state actions. This has also
diluted the common political identity that Indians invoked through their external
neighbor: Indians stopped being Indians only because they were Anti-Pakistan.

Capitalism and its Impact on National Identity
	
  
Another reason for strong recurrence of India’s social problem is the advent of
Capitalism in India. In recent history, the political and economic discourse in India has
shifted. While it still mainly revolves around issues of economic development and
growth, there is an apparent shift in the solutions discussed, with business and capitalism
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taking center stage. In the early decades socialist 5-year plans enacted and executed by
the state were meant to foster development, but now the focus has shifted towards private
enterprise and the opening up of the economy to foster growth. Capitalism and the
potential it holds in creating wealth have captured India’s imagination. The fact that
within a short span of two decades, economic liberalization has propelled the country
onto the global stage has only reaffirmed the value of capitalism and has invoked in
Indians a desire to create wealth.
Capitalism however has not been conducive to the creation of a national identity.
Unlike the United States, India has not been able to combine common political notions of
freedom and liberty with Capitalism. Capitalism has become a tool for an individual,
usually the elite, to grow wealthy and powerful. It has not necessarily been an economic
movement where the masses have gained greater economic freedom and prosperity. For
example, since the economic reforms of 1991, income inequality has almost doubled in
India with almost 42% of its population living under the poverty line.2 In short, India has
adopted Capitalism without necessarily imbibing the values of Capitalism that make it a
fair and effective system for the commonweal.
This is problematic because one of the main tenants of the free market system is
competition: competition among individuals for limited resources. The rules of
competition are established universally, usually through a national consensus that would
be in sync with their national identity. A lack of a common national identity makes it
hard to establish common rules. While theoretically rules of competition exist in India,
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"India income inequality doubles in 20 years, says OECD." BBC 7 Dec. 2011: n. pag.
Print.
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the right spirit and values accompanying the rules are missing, making the rules
ineffective and hard to enforce. This has led to what the Economist calls, “Crony
Capitalism,” where corruption and “rent-seeking” through political connections becomes
a method of succeeding and making money.3This advent of Crony Capitalism and the
lack of a common national identity have forced people to strengthen their associations
with their historical social identities. Every individual wants a share of the limited natural
resources and wants to grow wealthy and powerful. In an environment where the
common basic rules of engagement are unclear, the individual forms groups for the
purpose of safety and prosperity. Factions are easiest to form around social identities,
especially if the association with these identities is strong and deep-rooted. This idea is
further compounded in India by the fact that society especially commerce, functioned
under the law of hereditary. So economic associations and inter-dependence within
communities were extremely strong. Therefore the competition between individuals
under fair conditions now becomes a competition between different groups and
communities with unclear rules of engagement, under a system of Crony Capitalism. This
is what has happened in India and this threatens to disintegrate India’s political unity.

Present Problems: Factionalism and Ineffective Democracy
	
  
Short-lived national political identities based on external factors, and the onset of
an exploitative economic system like Capitalism without its basic rules and values,
undermine India’s political identity in two interconnected ways: by creating factionalism
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  "The new age of crony capitalism." The Economist 15 Mar. 2014: n. pag. Print.
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and by making democracy ineffective. Factionalism occurs because people start
associating more closely with identities related to religion, caste, region, class, sex, etc.
They start preferring some of these identities over their other identities especially the
political identity that relates to the larger nation. As discussed above, national identities
cannot be sustained solely through external political entities. Therefore a lack of an
explicit understanding of what innately makes one Indian contributes to this factionalism.
It is much easier to associate with identities that one can observe around them rather than
some theoretical notions of nationhood, especially when they are not made explicit.
Furthermore as discussed, the advent of Crony Capitalism where the focus is on
competition and exploitation of limited resources, has forced people to form factions for
mutual safety and prosperity.
The problem with the creation of these factions is that they start developing animosity
towards one another. These tensions rise not only because of economic reasons but also
because of social and religious differences, which are made more explicit through the
creation of these factions. And this animosity often has the potential to turn violent. A
prime example of this in India is the Kashmir dispute, which highlights complicated
religious, social and economic tensions between various groups of people. There are also
cases of various minor and major insurgencies of people rising up against the country and
demanding certain rights. Some of these have been based on region such as the NorthEast insurgency, or religion such as the Khalistan movement in Punjab, or economics
such as the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in Central India. These have turned violent,
resulting in the death of thousands of people. For example the Maoist violence has
resulted in the death of more than 10,000 people and has displaced approximately 12
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million people 4. Factionalism has also resulted in numerous riots. The most famous of
these are the riots that erupted across India after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in
1992, or the Godhra riots that took place in 2002. Factionalism has created social tension
that has resulted in violence and has undermined the notion of the larger nation of India.
It has focused on identity of difference, where people are pitted against each other,
undermining the larger political identity they all share in common.
Factionalism has had an adverse impact on the functioning of democracy. Apart from
creating social unrest, it has also undermined the efficacy and fairness of the democratic
process and the institutions of democracy. Stronger identification with smaller
communities has led to political factionalism that gives preference to narrow group
interests over larger national interests. While it is important to understand the concerns
and the interests of every group, a minority or a majority, I also think that the larger
interests of society are fundamentally more important. In a capitalist democracy fractured
by factionalism, group interests are being given higher preference at the cost of other
equally, if not more important societal interests. This has adverse effects when it starts
manifesting in political discourse and public policy, as has been the case in India.
Different political parties in India have sought to represent the interests of various
groups, leading to what experts call “vote-bank” politics. Vote-bank politics is the
practice of maintaining voting blocks who vote for certain candidates on the basis of
narrow communal considerations such as religion, caste, region among other things.
Vote-bank politics is divisive in nature as it pits the interests of one community against
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  Garda , Imran. "India's Silent War." Aljazeera 21 Oct. 2011: n. pag. Print.
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the other. Usually political candidates run for office on the platform of policies that might
benefit certain communities over others. For example, it is very common in India to run
on the platform of reservation, where candidates promise reservation of government jobs
or university seats for a minority community to get their vote in the election. Such
politics is inimical to a democracy. It undermines the larger interests of the country.
Furthermore it has led to a divisive political climate where the institutions of
democracy have been abused to make the Indian system inefficient and stagnant.
Different regional parties with different agendas start competing for the limited national
resources, making national consensus harder to achieve. This is aptly demonstrated by the
functioning of the Indian parliament in the recent past. In 2013, the Indian Parliament lost
1000 working hours due to disruptions caused by Parliamentarians standing up on various
issues5. Each hour lost not only results in monetary loss (Rs. 2.5 million 6), but it also
leads to a decline in parliamentary debate and in the passage of parliamentary bills. For
example Question Hour, the hour meant to raise questions on particular bills, was
conducted for only 13% of the scheduled times in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and
29% in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House).7 In-fact for the first time in history, last year the
Rajya Sabha (Upper House) returned the Union Budget Bill without any debate.8
Furthermore the Parliament experienced its lowest point this February when
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"Parliament lost over 1,000 hours due to disruptions: Report." DNA 18 Dec. 2013: n.
pag. Print.
6
VK, Vinod. "Dangerous decline of Parliament's role in India." Indian Express 18 Dec.
2013: n. pag. Print.
7
VK, Vinod. "Dangerous decline of Parliament's role in India." Indian Express 18 Dec.
2013: n. pag. Print.
8	
  PARSAI, GARGI. "Rajya Sabha approves Budget without debate." The Hindu 22 Mar.
2013: n. pag. Print.	
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pandemonium broke out in the Parliament with its Members turning riotous and
brandishing pepper spray, knifes and other weapons.9 Most worryingly a divisive
political climate, created by the emergence of political factionalism, has led to more
acrimony between the various groups. It has led to more hate based campaigns as can be
seen by the present national elections, which has been extremely vitriolic in terms of the
language and the threats used by different candidates. Every day reports appear of
different leaders indulging in “hate speeches” against certain communities to court their
personal vote-banks.10
Divisive and communal politics has only heightened tensions between various groups
and communities. It has perpetuated a cycle of hatred, where factionalism leads to
political factionalism that makes democratic institutions ineffective, further intensifying
factionalism that breeds hatred and undermines larger notions of a national identity.
Usually the challenges of a democracy are the adoption of a workable system, the
conduct of free and fair elections, the generation of voter interest and participation and its
protection from the anarchists, the dictators and the military regimes. A great democracy
like India shows that after these challenges are conquered, the greatest threat to a
democracy is itself; democracy’s greatest challenge is to protect it from itself. To protect
itself, India has to protect the sanctity of its Parliament from its Parliamentarians, it has to
safeguard public interests from the vested interests of those people who claim to
represent public interest, it has to save its citizens from its many people. The pertinent
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Agarwal, Vibhuti. "Violence Erupts in India Parliament." Wall Street Journal 13 Feb.
2014: n. pag. Print.
10
Umur, Baba. "Getting away with hate speeches in India." Aljazeera 24 Apr. 2014: n.
pag. Print.	
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question is how can India protect its Republic? This is challenging because the
cornerstone of the Indian Republic, Democracy itself is facing a crisis that makes it
ineffective as a tool to redress India’s problem. This problem is further compounded by
the lack of an explicit Indian national identity that could have provided Indian
Democracy the fundamental grounding to resolve its crisis. The purpose of this paper is
to find a way to make the Indian national identity more explicit so that the present crisis
of the Indian Democracy can be resolved.

Epistemological Crisis
	
  
Indian Democracy’s ineffectiveness according to me is India’s present day
“epistemological crisis11.” Scottish philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre describes an
“epistemological crisis” as “a state affecting the consciousness of either an individual or
culture, wherein existing epistemologies, or ways of knowing, no longer seem adequate
to accurately comprehend or describe the world.” India’s political crisis is that the
exercise of democracy, the very foundation of the Indian union, is potentially
undermining the union. The solution to any political problem would be the usage of
democracy. But when the usage of democracy, the tool itself becomes a problem then the
consequences can be catastrophic. This is the crisis that India is facing and it is apparent
in all the protests that have recently taken place; protests against laws and government
institutions that do not actually focus on any solutions. In-fact the present popularity of
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
11Alisdair MacIntyre 	
  “EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISES, DRAMATIC NARRATIVE
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE”, The Monist ,Vol. 60, No. 4, Historicism and
Epistemology (OCTOBER, 1977) , pp. 453-472
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Narendra Modi, an authoritarian and divisive figure known for his Hindutva links, in the
ongoing national election highlights Indian’s growing frustration with the democratic
process. Recent polls have even shown that many Indians prefer dictatorship to
democracy.12 Vested interests have abused democracy so much that it has become
ineffective for the commonweal. Due to abuse, the existing “way of knowing”
(democracy) has become inadequate in solving India’s social problems.
MacIntyre goes on to argue that to survive such a crisis and to avoid tragedy, a
tradition must undergo an “epistemological break”: “a reconfiguration of epistemology
such that new ways of knowing and new pieces of knowledge come into proper
alignment with one another” (Vajpeyi 4). According to MacIntyre the break for European
science in the 17th century came through Galileo’s revolutionary text, Dialogue
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (Ptolemaic and Copernican). Ananya Vajpeyi
in her book, The Righteous Republic argues that Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj addressed a
similar crisis that Indian political traditions were facing in the early 1900’s. She argues
that “What Galileo was to the European scientific tradition, Gandhi was to the Indian
political tradition: not so much an inventor or a discoverer as the first one to see that new
historical circumstances necessitated new ways of being in the world, new ways of
processing what was known, and new strategies for coping with what was still unknown”
(Vajpeyi 4). Hind Swaraj, which translates into Indian Self-Rule, was “Gandhi’s
meditation on India’s self and India’s sovereignty, without which it is not possible to
imagine how he would have gone on to lead India to freedom from colonial rule”(Vajpeyi
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
12	
  Ghosh, Paramita. "Young India irony: 75% will vote but 52% support
dictatorship."Hindustan Times 5 Aug. 2013: n. pag. Print.	
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5).
Ananya Vajpeyi goes onto point out that Swaraj, the term used by Gandhi,
became the primary demand and focus of the freedom movement. It literally means “SelfRule”: the rule by the self or the rule over the self, where the both the object and the
subject of the “Rule” (Raj) is the self (Swa). Vajpeyi argues that the “raj” part of Swaraj
has dominated the historical narrative of the freedom movement. The historical narrative
has focused on how political sovereignty was achieved from the British Empire, ignoring
completely the “the self to whom this sovereignty belongs, and over whom this
sovereignty is exercised” (Vajpeyi 2). Her book then becomes “an account of the search
for the self in modern India” (Vajpeyi 1) by analyzing what five of India’s founders
thought about the self through their engagement with various texts.
I do not think that the present crisis in democracy requires a revolutionary
“epistemological break” of the sort Gandhi conjured with Hind Swaraj. What we need is
more of an “epistemological shift” that refocuses our attention on the “Swa”, the Self
instead of the “Raj”, the institutions. Therefore to solve the crisis in Indian Democracy,
we need to revisit the question of national identity, instead of just redressing
malfunctioning democratic institutions. We need to ask ourselves, what it means to be
Indian: what is the idea of “Swa”, of the Self that connects the diverse people of India?
The present crisis stems out from the abuse of the “Raj”, the democratic institutions. The
abuse occurs from the notion that the Indian Self is diverse and incorporates many
“Selves”, and that people associate themselves more with their immediate identity rather
than their national identity. The association with a national identity has not been made
explicit. This confused sense of identity leads to the inefficient use of the democracy in
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place. In western terms, India is a Nation-State that tries to represent many different
Nations or Peoples. Usually a Nation-State is established after the Nation or the People
have been identified. It derives its political legitimacy by acting as a sovereign territorial
unit for a particular Nation. A Nation represents a cultural or ethnic entity, while a State
is a political and geopolitical entity. The term Nation-State implies that the two coincide
geographically. For example the Franks (Nation) came together in the area presently
occupied by them to form the Nation-State of France. India’s problem lies in the
identification of the Indian People, because it contains a multitude of people from the
Punjabis to the Marathis to the Rajputs etc. The “epistemological shift” would require a
shift in focus from the State to the Nation. The State part of the Nation-State or the “Raj”
part of Swaraj has dominated not only the historical narrative of the freedom movement
but also the current debate on addressing India’s various issues. In the process the “Swa”
or the “Nation”, which was mediated on by the founders has become lost and unclear.
In this paper I am arguing that to create a strong, just and inclusive Indian NationState we need to make explicit the meaning of the Indian People. What does it mean to be
an Indian? What forms the self or the “Swa”? It is the same set of questions that
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister insightfully elaborated in his celebrated
book The Discovery of India at the very beginning of the third chapter, appropriately
titled “The Quest”:
What was this India that possessed me and beckoned to me continually,
urging me to action so that we might realize some vague but deeply-felt
desire of our hearts?...What is this India, apart from her physical and
geographical aspects? What did she represent in the past? What gave
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strength to her then? How did she lose that old strength? And has she lost
it completely? Does she represent anything vital now, apart from being the
home of a vast number of human beings? How does she fit into the
modern world? (Vajpeyi iv)

The purpose of this paper is to argue for a common political platform for people
of diverse communities, so that they can peacefully and justly deliberate on different
issues. This political platform can resolve the race problem by giving an equal
opportunity to different people to engage in democracy. Therefore a common political
platform is meant to be used as a tool of deliberation that will strengthen the democratic
process. The argument here is that a common political platform is essential for people
with different social identities to be able to build consensus. It is essential for a pluralistic
democracy like India to function.
I am arguing that to create a common political platform we need to make explicit
the identity that people share. This does not mean that I am trying to create a unique
Indian identity. Neither am I proposing the idea of coming up with an exhaustive list of
existing traits that make someone Indian. My aim is argue for a process that will help
people in identifying what they share in common. This shared identity then can be used to
create that common political platform essential for democratic deliberation. Therefore the
purpose of the paper is to establish the legitimacy of a process that will make explicit the
identity that people already share. Once this political identity has been made explicit, it
can be used as a tool to make democracy function better, allowing people with different
claims to deliberate on their claims on an equal platform.
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In the paper I will argue that the process that is most suited to this exercise of
finding common ground is Amartya Sen’s process of creating Open Impartiality. In
Chapter 3, I will show how the Sensian model is appropriate because it seeks to
incorporate the differences present in different groups of people and tries to find the
common ground necessary for consensus building. I will contrast this with Rawl’s
method of Closed Impartiality to show how the Sensian method is more suited to the
Indian context. In the next chapter I will analyze the vision of two of India’s founder,
Mohandas Karamchandra Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. Based on their writings, I
will gauge what they thought being Indian meant. In the conclusion I will endeavor to see
evaluate if an understanding of their views can then be used constructively to assess what
common grounds they shared. This small application of the Sensian model can hopefully
be used to assess the efficacy of the model. Hopefully this exercise can also illuminate
some basic understanding that can help in the formation of a blueprint for its wider
practical application to a larger group of people.
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Chapter 2- The Philosophical Approaches
	
  

Introduction
	
  
In this chapter I will analyze and compare two different philosophical approaches
that can be applied to the formation of a just society: Rawls’ Closed Impartiality
approach and Sen’s Open Impartiality approach. Specifically I will assess which one of
these approaches is appropriate for understanding shared identity between diverse groups
of people: an identity that can provide a common political platform for different people to
engage in meaningful democratic deliberation.
Before comparing these two approaches, however I will explore the basis of these
philosophical approaches and the importance of this basis. Using Sen’s understanding I
will analyze the basis by first arguing for the importance of Reason. I will argue that
Reason is ultimately important because it fulfills the “demands of Objectivity,” which is
necessary to establish Impartiality. And Impartiality is the cornerstone of a just society.
Therefore both the approaches are different methods of ensuring Impartiality while
decisions regarding the structure of society are being deliberated upon. After I have
established the importance of Impartiality in creating just societies, I will elucidate and
compare the two approaches to Impartiality, eventually arguing that Sen’s Open
Impartiality is more appropriate to understand and make explicit shared identities
between diverse groups of people.
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Reason, Objectivity and Impartiality
Sen effectively uses the example of the Mughal Emperor, Akbar to point out the
necessity of Reason in scrutinizing social, political, legal and cultural practices.
According to Sen in assessing public policy, Akbar’s underlying argument was that “’the
pursuit of reason’ (rather than what he called ‘the marshy land of tradition’) is the way to
address difficult problems of good behavior and the challenges of constructing a just
society” (Sen 38). Sen goes on to argue that “Akbar took reason to be supreme, since
even in disputing reason we would have to give reasons for that disputation” (Sen 39). A
prime example of Akbar’s reliance on reason was his engagement with social and
religious practices. He created systematic dialogues between people from different
religious ideologies including agnostics and atheists, even establishing a syncretic
religion called Dīn-i Ilāhī that intended to merge the best elements of all religions and
promote communal peace and harmony between his diverse subjects. Laying the
foundation of a secular and religiously neutral Indian state, Akbar interpreted secularism
“as the requirement that the state be equidistant from different religions and must not
treat any religion with special favor” (Sen 37). His assessment was based on his reliance
on the ‘path of reason’ or ‘the rule of the intellect’ (rahi aql), which he concluded was
“the basic determinant of good and just behavior as well as of an acceptable framework
of legal duties and mechanisms” (Sen 39)
Using Akbar, Sen is able to point out the indispensability of reason in critical
scrutiny of ethical judgments. The question remains why ‘rahi aql’, the rule of the
intellect, is seen to be so important? Is it because Reason in itself is a value-giving
quality? Or perhaps it is because Reason can provide some surety of reaching the truth.
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Sen argues that “the case for reasoned scrutiny lies not in any sure-fire way of getting
things exactly right (no such way may exist), but on being as objective as we reasonably
can” (Sen 40). According to Sen it is the “demands of objectivity” that require the
reliance on the ‘path of reason.’ Sen also addresses the arguments against Reason, where
it is used to justify forcefully help beliefs. Sen here argues that if someone justifies their
wrongly held beliefs and performs unjust acts then the fault does not lie in Reason itself.
Bad reasoning cannot be an appropriate critique of the power of reason. In-fact he argues
that the remedy for bad reasoning lies in better reasoning and therefore Reason still reigns
supreme.
Sen sees objectivity as a difficult issue in philosophy. He however uses John
Rawls’ characterization of moral and political objectivity as the foundation to his
understanding of objectivity. John Rawls argues: “The first essential is that a conception
of objectivity must establish a public framework of thought sufficient for the concept of
judgment to apply and for conclusions to be reached on the basis of reasons and evidence
after discussion and due reflection…. To say that a political conviction is objective is to
say that there are reasons, specified by a reasonable and mutually recognizable political
conception (satisfying those essentials), sufficient to convince all reasonable persons that
it is reasonable” (Sen 42). In-spite of some clearly normative demands (particularly the
identification of ‘reasonable persons’), Sen argues that Rawls’ approach might not be
very different from Habermas’ procedural approach, which focuses on open and informed
public discussion. Sen goes onto argue that open public deliberation is important for
establishing objectivity and that the “role of unrestricted public reasoning is quite central
to democratic politics in general and to the pursuit of social justice in particular” (Sen
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44). Regarding Rawl’s statement about ‘reasonable persons’, Sen argues that it is the
“characterization of deliberating human beings rather than a categorization of some
‘reasonable persons’ while excluding others” (Sen 44). Sen thinks that all human beings
are capable of being reasonable and of having open-minded deliberations: an idea which
is not that fundamentally different from Rawls’ own idea of ‘free and equal persons’ with
‘moral powers’.
To elaborate the importance of public reasoning in establishing objectivity, Sen
uses Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator approach. Public reasoning would require that
perspectives and reasonings presented by any relevant person involved should be given
the opportunity to be considered. Rawls’ main focus was on variations of personal
interests and personal priorities. Whereas Smith’s “insistence that we must inter alia view
our sentiments from a ‘certain distance from us’ is motivated by the object of scrutinizing
not only the influence of vested interests, but also the impact of entrenched tradition and
custom” (Sen 45). Smith invokes the Impartial Spectator to avoid issues of local
parochialism of values that might inhibit a particular culture from considering certain
pertinent arguments.
Sen acknowledges that Habermas, Smith and Rawls approach objectivity
similarly “to the extent that objectivity is linked, directly or indirectly, by each of them to
the ability to survive challenges from informed scrutiny coming from diverse quarters”
(Sen 45). Sen goes onto further argue that the reasons that survive this scrutiny need not
be limited to one unique set. Sen is “arguing for the possibility that there may remain
contrary positions that simultaneously survive and which cannot be subjected to some
radical surgery that reduces them all into one tidy box of complete and well-fitted
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demands, which in Rawls theory, take us to some unique institutional route to fulfill these
requirements (to be implemented by a sovereign state)” (Sen 46). Sen eventually
concludes that “reasoned encounter on an impartial basis” (Sen 46) is a necessity for
ethical objectivity.
Therefore in the quest for a just and ethical society, Impartiality based on
Objectivity and Reason is paramount. As Sen argues objective deliberation based on
reason that can stand public scrutiny is important in establishing impartiality. This is the
attempt of both the philosophical approaches illustrated below.

Rawls’ Closed Impartiality Approach
	
  
The central idea for Rawls’ theory of justice is that justice has to be understood in
terms of the demands of fairness. In this approach fairness is considered to be
foundational, preceding the development of principles of justices. But what is fairness?
According to Sen, “This foundational idea can be given shape in various ways, but
central to it must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking interests and
concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our
respective vested interest, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It
can broadly be seen as a demand for impartiality” (Sen 54).
Rawls addresses these demands of impartiality through his constructive idea of
the “Original Position”. The Original Position is an imagined situation where the parties
involved are unaware of their own personal identities. This “Veil of Ignorance” creates a
situation where the parties have no knowledge of any vested interests, ensuring a
primordial equality that removes personal bias and thus creates fairness. As Rawls puts
it, “ The original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the
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fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name ‘justice as
fairness’”(Sen 55). It is important to note here that Rawls considers justice as fairness as
a political conception of justice that allows people with diverging views, to have a
common basis for public discussion on fundamental political questions.
Rawls uses this ‘veil of ignorance’ exercise to identify the legitimate principles of
justice that determine the choice of just institutions required to create the basic structure
of a society. Rawls makes the strong claim that a specific set of principles of justice
would unanimously emerge from the Original Position, constituting a specific political
conception of justice that would be shared by all the members of that society. Thus these
specific principles of justice would impact the choice of institutions, which will create the
basic structure of society, as well as influence the political conception of justice, which
would influence individual behaviors that will conform to this conception.
The unanimous agreement on these principles of justice under a ‘veil of
ignorance’ is the first step in Rawls’ mutli-staged conception of a just society. The
principles of justice lead to the ‘constitutional stage’ where actual institutions are selected
based on the principles, taking into account the circumstances of each society. The
working of these institutions occurs in the “legislative stage,” where appropriate laws are
enacted and social decisions are made. The whole process, based on the two unique
principles of justice, has very specific steps that finally lead to the establishment of just
institutions that ensure a just society.
The principles of justice he comes up with are as follows (Sen 59):
1. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.[1]
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2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (Rawls, 1971, p.302;
revised edition, p. 47):
(a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of
society, consistent with the just savings principle (the difference principle).
(b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.
It is important to note that in his principles of justice, Rawls prioritizes liberty,
giving precedence to the first principle. Sen argues that even though Rawls’ claim of
absolute superiority of liberty might seem extreme, “the more general claim that lies
behind all this is that liberty cannot be reduced to being only a facility that complements
other facilities (such as economic opulence); there is something very special about the
place of personal liberty in human lives” (Sen 59). Therefore liberty’s importance lies not
only as means to an end but also an end itself. Rawls addresses issues of institutional
choice in his second principle. The first part is concerned with distributive equity as well
as overall efficiency. It is called the ‘Difference Principle’ and it focuses on making the
worst of people as well off as possible. The second part is concerned with ensuring that
public opportunities are open to all and that no one is excluded for arbitrary reasons like
race, religion etc.
In analyzing equity of distribution, Rawls invokes the concept of ‘primary goods’
that include things such as ‘rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the
social bases of self-respect,’ which are essentially means to achieve different ends.
Certain things that are not included in the distributional concerns include claims based on
entitlements related to ideas of merits and deserts, or on ownership of property. An
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interesting thing that Rawls acknowledges is productivities that advance efficiency and
equity. Inequalities related to such productivities are allowed if the Difference Principle
is upheld, for example through the operation of incentives. Such concession to the
operation of incentives is highly contentious and has been criticized on various grounds.

Positives of Rawls’ Approach
	
  
There are many positive contributions that Rawls’ approach has made to our
thinking in moral and political philosophy. First, the foundational idea of “justice as
fairness”, which makes fairness central to the notion of justice, adds valuable insights
into our understanding of political philosophy. Second, Rawls’ argument about the nature
and importance of objectivity in practical reason has far-reaching implications on our
understanding and use of reason in deliberations. Third, Rawls points out “the moral
powers’ that people possess allowing them the ‘capacity for a sense of justice.’ This is in
contrast to the rational choice theory in which human beings are only interested in their
own self, without any regard for other ideas of fairness and justice. Rawls is further able
to enrich the concept of rationality by pursuing the distinction between ‘rational’ and
‘reasonable.’ Fourth, Rawls’ focus on liberty draws attention “to the strong case for
seeing liberty as a separate and, in many ways, overriding concern in the assessment of
the justice of social arrangements” (Sen 63). This is separate from the role liberty plays as
a ‘primary good’, as a general means to an end, for example in the practice of public
reasoning, which forms the basis of social evaluation. Fifth, Rawls’ focus on procedural
fairness by insisting on equal opportunity for all significantly adds to our understanding
of inequality, which has often focused on inequality of outcomes. Sixth, the priority given
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to distributional equity through the Difference Principle draws attention to the
predicament of the worst-off people in terms of deprivation of ‘Primary Goods.’ This has
been a powerful influence in public policy regarding poverty removal. Finally according
to Sen by focusing on ‘Primary Goods,’ “Rawls gives indirect acknowledgment to the
importance of human freedom in giving people real-as distinct from only formally
recognized- opportunity to do what they would like with their own lives” (Sen 64).

Sen’s Open Impartiality Approach
	
  
Sen’s approach is inspired by Adam Smith’s thought experiment on impartiality,
which invokes the device of the ‘impartial spectator.’ In The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Smith explains the idea of an ‘impartial spectator’ as the requirement to “examine our
own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” (Sen
124). The basic distinction that Sen sees between the Rawls’s Closed Impartiality
approach and Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ device, is that Smith’s focus is to broaden the
reach of ethical inquiry by bringing in disinterested people from other societies as well.
The perspectives are not necessarily accounted for in Rawls’ approach.
To understand Sen’s approach it is important to realize the distinction between
two general approaches to thinking about political philosophy: transcendental
institutionalism and realization-focused comparison. Transcendental institutionalism
concentrates “on identifying just institutional arrangements for a society” (Sen 5). The
focus here is on identifying perfect justice and on getting the institutions right. The
‘contractarian’ tradition, which Rawls is a part of, focuses on transcendental
institutionalism. On the other hand, realization-focused comparison are “often interested
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primarily in the removal of manifest injustice” (Sen 7). For this tradition the focus is not
on perfect justice, but actual realized justice. Sen like Smith is a proponent of this
tradition.
Therefore Sen’s focus is not on achieving perfect justice. He wants to focus on
creating a more just world rather than a perfectly just world. To do so Sen argues for the
expansion of impartiality. Sen’s approach requires the use of two devices: Smith’s
‘impartial spectator’ and public reasoning. He argues that to ensure justice, one must
expand the discussion by impartially incorporating the viewpoints of different people. For
example if two diverse groups of people came in contact, then to ensure that they could
form a union which was fair and sustainable both groups would have to engage in
impartial public discussion and find common ground. Impartiality would be achieved
using the device of the ‘impartial spectator’, where members of each group would
scrutinize their beliefs and the beliefs of others by assuming the role of an unbiased third
party. Based on this interaction, both groups would find some common ground that will
ensure a fair union between the groups.
This process would be repeated to expand and include other groups of people. It is
important to note that unlike Rawls’ approach, Sen’s approach believes that impartiality
is achieved by increasing the number of opinions. Sen’s approach, unlike Rawls’
approach also incorporates the differences in people’s opinion to increase effectiveness.
Sen acknowledges differences in people’s beliefs and instead of ignoring them like
Rawls, uses it to powerfully argue for a type of impartiality that is perhaps more practical
to achieve and to expand.
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Closed Impartiality vs. Open Impartiality: Why Sen works better than
Rawls?
	
  
The problem with India is that there are many different groups of people with
different social identities. Their national identity as an Indian is not explicit, making
Indian Democracy highly factionalized and ineffective. Therefore the aim of this paper is
to find a legitimate approach that can incorporate the many different social identities of
the Indian people, to hopefully find a common political platform that can be used by the
people to engage in democratic discourse and make democracy efficient. In this section I
am arguing that that legitimate approach is the Sensian approach and that it is better than
the Rawlsian approach because of the following reasons:

Presupposition of Identity
	
  
The main reason why Rawls’ Closed Impartiality approach does not solve India’s
problem is that it presupposes the existence of a common political identity. In the “Veil
of Ignorance,” different persons come together to discuss the principles of justice and
create a just society around these principles. This discussion however happens with no
person knowing what their personal identity is going to be in the actual society. The only
thing they know is that they are part of a particular society for which they are coming
together in the “Veil of Ignorance.” This piece of knowledge, the only information that
the persons have coming into the “Veil of Ignorance,” assumes the pre-existence of a
common political identity. Rawls assumes that the persons coming into the “Veil of
Ignorance” know that they are part of a particular Nation, coming to form a just NationState: he assumes the existence of a common political identity. While this assumption is
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appropriate for a European conception of the Nation-State where people formed their
countries based on their common ethnicity, this assumption clearly does not solve the
problem of a missing common political identity for the ethnically diverse Indians.
Furthermore Rawls’ pre-supposition of a common political identity would not
incorporate the multiple social identities that people might identify with. Rawls’ model
would seek to ignore the existence of different social identities, assuming that people will
concentrate on only their common political identity in the “Veil of Ignorance.” This is
again problematic for India’s case where people with different strong social identities,
based on different criteria such as religion, caste, region among others, exist. Sen’s
approach on the other hand not only does not assume the existence of a common political
identity, it also incorporates the differences that exist among diverse group of people.
Sen’s model works by acknowledging the existence of multiple social identities and using
that knowledge to identity common ground to create a common political platform that
enables deliberation among diverse group of people. Sen’s model works better for India
because it opens up the discussion to diversity, rather than close the discussion to a
particular group of people like the Rawlsian model.
Feasibility of Unique solutions- Plurality of Reasons
	
  
The second criticism relates to Rawls’ unique choice of the two principles of
justice. Rawls strongly claims that “they are the principles that rational and free persons
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as
defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association” ([Rawls, p 11- Wiki). His
whole unfolding of completely just societal arrangement is based on these two specific
principles of justice. Sen however argues that there is the “possible sustainability of
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plural and competing reasons for justice, all of which have claims to impartiality and
which nevertheless differ from-and rival- each other” (Sen 12). There is a possibility of a
plurality of unbiased reasons, all of which incorporate impartiality and fairness, and can
be ‘will(ed) to be a universal law’ (Kant’s Universal law for evaluating reasons). This is
especially pertinent in the case of India, where due to the multiplicity of social identities,
people have different but impartial reasons for justice. The social diversity in India
ensures the plurality of impartial reasons.
Sen illustrates this point with an example in which one has to decide which of
three children should get a flute they are quarreling about. The first child claims the flute
on the ground that she is the only one that knows how to play it. The second child claims
it on the ground that he is the poorest of them all and has no other toys and therefore
needs the flute to play. The third child claims that he actually made the flute with his own
labor and therefore deserves the fruits of his labor. Theorists of different schools of
thought would give weightage to different considerations. A utilitarian might support the
first child because it might result in most pleasure. An economic egalitarian would
support the second child and a libertarian would support the third child. All three
arguments point to a different type of impartial and non-arbitrary reason, which cannot be
brushed aside as baseless. They are not just about the vested interest of each children,
rather they highlight how different social realizations can be achieved based on different
social institutions that are founded on different principles. This shows that there is a
possibility that plurality of reasons can exist. Therefore if there is no unique emergence
of a given set of principles then the entire process of ‘justice as fairness’ would be hard to
justify.
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Actual Behaviors
	
  
According to Rawls the basic structure of society is ‘the primary subject of
justice’ (Sen 67). He is focusing almost exclusively on ‘just institutions’, without taking
into account actual behavior of people that would influence the creation of ‘just
societies.’ Sen argues that Rawls’ approach is a very ‘niti’ centered approach, where the
focus is organizational propriety and behavioral correctness. Sen instead advocates a
more ‘nyaya’ based approach that focuses on the comprehensive concept of realized
justice. Accordingly there are two issues that emerge with this ‘niti’ based approach.
First one cannot neglect the actual social realizations that emerge from any choice
of institutions that are impacted by other social features such as behavioral pattern. One
has to take into account ‘Nyaya’ or realized justice for social evaluation. Second, even if
we agreed that through the exercise of ‘justice as fairness’ one can identify ‘reasonable’
or ‘just’ conduct, how would we enforce that behavior in a world where people’s actual
behavior would be different. Rawls argues that a ‘political conception’ of justice would
be formed and would be accepted by all, but that might still be very different from the
actual behavior of people. Ultimately for any practical application, a political theory
cannot just identify ‘just’ institutions for a society without making them contingent on
actual behavior, because practical reasoning about social justice requires a combination
of both.
Relevance of Global Perspectives
	
  
As mentioned before, the social contract approach propagated by Rawls inescapably
limits the number of participants in the discussion to the members of a given society or
the ‘people.’ If one continues with this approach then the way to include everyone in the
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world would be to have a ‘cosmopolitan’ extension of the Rawlsian original position,
which is deeply problematic and impractical. And yet one cannot ignore the relevance of
what happens outside one’s society or country to better evaluate justice. This is because
the happenings in a country have an influence, sometimes huge on the rest of the world.
Second, each society has parochial beliefs, which might need more global scrutiny to
broaden the scope of discussion and considerations. While the Rawlsian approach deals
with issues of vested interest of individuals within a given society, it is unable to address
issues of local parochialism present in the society. Therefore to ensure a just Indian state,
it is important to take into account multiple perspectives, even the ones outside the
country. This task is better performed by Sen’s Open Impartiality approach rather than
Rawls’ Closed Impartiality approach.
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Chapter 3- Indian Thinkers
In this chapter, based on their writings, I will elaborate the visions that two main
founders of India had regarding the country: M.K Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. The
aim of this chapter is to first understand what both these visionaries thought was the
meaning of being Indian. After their views have been explained I will conclude by
applying Sen’s approach and seeing if their different notions of being Indian have any
common ground. Hopefully this minor application can provide an insight into how a
practical blueprint of Sen’s approach for a larger group of people can be established.

Mohandas Karamchandra Gandhi
	
  
M.K Gandhi was the preeminent leader of the Indian freedom movement, leading
the country to independence in 1947. He is most famous for his theories of “Satyagraha”
(insistence on truth or truth-force) and “Ahimsa,” which he employed in his radical nonviolent civil disobedience movement against the British. His life and his philosophy have
endeared him to the Indian public and has been an inspiration the world over for similar
non-violent freedom movements. Vajpeyi captures the essence and importance of
Gandhi’s life when she describes a famous mural dedicated to him, which paints Gandhi
“as a timeless figure, the protagonist of a narrative that is as much moral as it is
historical, its events and transitions marked by Gandhi’s mistakes, realizations,
epiphanies, and miracles—moments that bring together a man’s mortal life, the history of
India, and the greater quest of the human race for an ethical society” (Vajpeyi 53).
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In this section, using Vajpeyi’s analysis I will explain the lens with which Gandhi
viewed Indian claims to selfhood and sovereignty. He essentially used the two political
categories of Swaraj (Self-Rule) and Ahimsa (Non-Violence) to explore the question of
Indian identity. These categories are explained in the following sections.
Introduction to the categories
	
  
According to Vajpeyi two important political categories that were applied by
Gandhi to understand Indian identity and lay the political foundations of Modern India
were Swaraj (Self-Rule) and Ahimsa (Non-Violence). She argues that semantically the
self is present in both the categories. Swaraj directly incorporates the self, literally
meaning the rule (raj) of the self (Swa). Ahimsa literally means the “the absence of the
desire to harm.” It incorporates the self through a concealed desiderative (hims-), stating
that harm is absent (negativizer “a”) from the intention of the implied subject, the self. It
is important to understand that in Gandhi’s idea of the self, both the individual and a
collective selfhood were addressed. Thus his intention was to understand “how one might
purify one’s being by removing from it the reflex of violence (the intention to harm
another) and, simultaneously, how a non-violent political community might be
constructed for the greater good of India and humanity at large” (Vajpeyi 50).
At this point it would be natural to ask why Swaraj and Ahimsa are specifically
chosen? One might argue that a narrow focus on Swaraj and Ahimsa might not provide a
complete understanding of Gandhi and his political philosophy. A comprehensive
analysis would require a study of all the various concepts he propagated, especially the
method in which he linked these concepts with each other. In-fact the linkages that he
created make it even harder to isolate certain political categories from the rest. This is
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especially problematic because unlike a Kant or a Rousseau, Gandhi was not necessarily
a systematic philosopher. He was a political visionary more in the mold of Madison,
Jefferson and even Lincoln.
Vajpeyi chooses Swaraj and Ahimsa as the categories to understand Gandhi’s
political ideology because these two categories play a central role in defining a modern
Indian political identity. They permit “Gandhian nationalism to ground itself in the idea
of a political tradition that has, at once, historical continuity, pan-Indian resonance, and a
creative capacity, responsive to the needs of a rapidly transforming present” (Vajpeyi 51).
Gandhi’s understanding of Swaraj derived from existing Indic categories that denote
transcendental liberation, redefines the concept already present in nationalist dialogue to
take it to the next phase. His use of Ahimsa resonates with Indians by connecting with the
primary themes from their political mytho-history. Therefore Gandhi’s Swaraj and
Ahimsa are of particular importance because they have historical Indic roots that make
them powerful concepts for the Indian people. As Vajpeyi aptly puts it:

Under Gandhi’s intellectual leadership, swaraj and ahimsa, whose theater
in Congress discourse was understood to be primarily political, became so
thoroughly enmeshed with their sister categories already present in Indic
discourses of transcendence that politics, ethics, and metaphysics began
for the first time to share a common conceptual terrain. This Gandhian
stroke of genius revitalized and revolutionized a tradition in crisis.
(Vajpeyi 52)
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Furthermore Gandhi uses Swaraj and Ahimsa not merely as ethical ideas in some
robust theory of ethical philosophy but also as practical tools for living life. This
categorization allows him to create a conceptual structure that can be used to assess
India’s political history. Through the categories of Swaraj and Ahimsa, he is able to
create a framework that can be used to assess the Indic conception of freedom and
identity. These factors make the concepts of Swaraj and Ahimsa particularly important in
Gandhi’s whole philosophy.
Swaraj (Self-Rule)
	
  
Gandhi wrote Hind Swaraj in 10 days while onboard a ship travelling from
London to Johannesburg. Using MacIntyre’s theory, Vajpeyi has argued that this text
written in a moment of epiphany characterized by claritas (lucidity) and veritas (truth),
resolves a crisis in Indic political tradition. Gandhi was confronting a political crisis
presented by the Partition of Bengal in 1905, the creation of the Muslim League in 1906,
the split between the moderate and the extremist factions of the Congress in 1907 and the
failure of the Swadeshi ideology in 1908. He did this by reinterpreting original Indic
categories like Swaraj and Ahimsa.
It’s interesting to note that Gandhi’s epistemological crisis was present both in the
political tradition that he was part off and his own personal journey, making him both
Galileo like and Hamlet like in MacIntyre’s account. His personal crisis included his own
struggles with celibacy (brahmacarya), with meat eating and vegetarianism, and his
experience of racial prejudice against him in South Africa. In-fact MacIntyre argues that
crisis in the personal self are related and traceable to the crisis in the overarching
tradition. As Vajpeyi puts it:
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But a crisis in the self, for MacIntyre, is ultimately traceable to or
concomitant with a crisis in the tradition that has formed the self. In this
way, an epistemological crisis that affects any given individual is related
to a larger epistemological crisis that affects a tradition as such, for
traditions and selves are mutually constitutive. By this ontology, selfhood
is embedded in a tradition. (Vajpeyi, 57)

Vajpeyi goes onto argue that the protagonist for this Indic political crisis is
Gandhi because his personal conflicts and tragedies run parallel to the larger narrative of
the freedom movement that experiences the crisis in tradition. Gandhi experiences
profound personal crisis whenever his non-violent political campaigns turn violent,
especially culminating in the massacre of the partition that accompanies India’s
independence. Therefore Gandhi has a crisis in his own self, which are traced back to the
crisis in Indic political tradition.
Vajpeyi believes that Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj is his reflection on the
epistemological crisis that could destroy the Indic politic. The epistemological break that
Gandhi provides comes from his endeavor “to show that what you call Swaraj is not truly
Swaraj”: his redefinition of the sovereignty of the self (Vajpeyi 58). The term “svarāj” or
“svarājya” was first used by the Marathas in defiance of Mughal authority in the midseventeenth century, invoking the idea of Maratha self rule. From this stemmed the idea
of Hindu self-rule, which inspired nationalists like Tilak, Gokhale, and Ranade at the
beginning of the twentieth century, effectively bringing the term into nationalistic
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discourse. But this idea of Swaraj held different meaning for different groups. Religious
extremists thought of Swaraj as the independence or rule of their particular religion,
without much consideration for a unified India. The colonial government supported
partial autonomy where India would still be Britain’s subordinate. The Moderates and
even the Congress under Nehru, did not insist on 100 percent self determination. It was
only in the 1940s that the idea of “purna swaraj” or rule of India by Indians, gained
ground. But what was Swaraj according to Gandhi? Partha Chatterjee has argued that
even though “purna swaraj” was achieved in 1947, it was incomplete because this
“political” swaraj fell short of the “true” swaraj that Gandhi had originally envisioned
(Vajpeyi 59).
Gandhi reinvented the term Swaraj in the same way he reinvented Ahimsa, by
connecting the term to its historical meaning. Gandhi’s Swaraj was related to the
historical categories of Moksha and Nirvana, which denoted freedom. These categories
however were ethical categories that came out of the discourses of transcendence instead
of the discourses of politics. Mukherjee has traced the genealogy of this Gandhian Swaraj
and has argued that this origin makes sense because “Gandhi himself thought of
“freedom” equally in political and in transcendental terms; or, to put it in another way, in
Western and in Indic terms” (Vajpeyi 60). Therefore for Gandhi, Swaraj was just not
about political freedom; it was about a wider notion of complete human emancipation, of
which political freedom was just one aspect.
Vajpeyi has argued that Gandhi’s main influence has been the Bhagavad Gita, a
philosophical dialogue between Krishna and Arjun that shows the different paths to attain
liberation. In the dialogue, Krishna argues that there are three equally legitimate paths
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(mārga) to attain ultimate freedom (mokṣa): knowledge (jñāna), action (karma), and
devotion (bhakti). Krishna also suggests that the means for the liberation of the soul from
the cycle of rebirth incorporates both the discipline of detachment (anāsakti yoga) and of
action free of the desire for its outcome (niśkāma karma). Mukherjee has argued that
Gandhi’s fight was not only for the political emancipation of India, but also for this
complete liberation of the soul. Gandhi’s rigorous exercises of self discipline, combined
with his political actions were all along simultaneously oriented towards both these goals:
the freedom of both the man and the nation. Therefore a political conception of “liberty”,
as professed in the Western world was only one half of the “liberty” that Gandhi
envisioned in his life. Gandhi’s Swaraj was about complete liberation that was political
but more importantly personal, almost to the extent that the political was dependent on
the personal.
Ahimsa (Non-Violence)
	
  
Historically, Ahimsa is mainly found in Jain doctrine, the Mahābhārata, the edicts
of Ashoka and occasionally in Brahmanical and Buddhist literature. The term seems to
have been limited to debates around certain social issues such as war, ritual sacrifice,
asceticism, hunting, and vegetarianism. Centuries later Gandhi is mainly thinking about
war and vegetarianism, and to an extent certain ascetic practices pertaining to
brahmacarya (celibacy): other aspects of the original social context in which Ahimsa was
used have disappeared. Ahimsa has mainly been a concern of ascetically oriented
religious schools, notably different types of Jainism and in certain cases some Buddhist
and Yogic schools. Even the epics have recognized the impracticality of its usage in
everyday life, especially for the political class.
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Vajpeyi points out that there have been only two major exceptions to this
apolitical application of Ahimsa in Indic antiquity: the reign of the Mauryan emperor,
Aśoka and the story of one of the main protagonists of the Mahābhārata, Yudhiṣṭhira.
Vajpeyi convincingly argues against the objection that Yudhiṣṭhira may or may not be a
historical figure. She points out that, “both have an equally complicated relationship to
historicity. To the extent that both figures are indispensable to any history of moral life in
the Indic world, both “exist” in the exact same way” (Vajpeyi 61).
Having established this, Vajpeyi investigates the role played by the moral
personalities called Aśoka and Yudhiṣṭhira in influencing India’s founders search for an
Indic selfhood and an Indic sovereignty. Vajpeyi argues:
(that both these figures) are associated centrally with a discourse
that connects power and violence, a king’s prerogative to rule versus his
duty to protect, the compulsions of order versus the demands of care. Both
yearn for peace and rectitude in near-apocalyptic circumstances. Both
embody the extreme moral dilemma (dharma-saṅkaṭa) that produces
narratives marked by irony and tragedy. Both are portrayed through tropes
like the riddle, the curse, and the change of heart—archaic “experiments
with truth”. (Vajpeyi 63)

In Indic political tradition their Ahimsa is most similar to Gandhi’s “nonviolence”, because they all believe that non-violence forms the very basis on which an
ideal society can be established. According to them non-violence is the “very principle
that upholds the world and makes possible ordered human existence” (Vajpeyi 63).
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Ahimsa originally belonged in the family of virtues, which were meant to regulate
the relationship between the self and the other. Practicing virtues like Ahimsa would lead
to a harmony between our material and our moral existence, eventually producing
personal liberation. Thus Ahimsa was a personal concept, one of many virtues meant for
self-discipline and self-control. This made the redefining of Ahimsa from a personal to a
political concept harder to accomplish. To translate Ahimsa as “non-violence” and to
treat it as a political virtue, Gandhi refocused on the political context in which Aśoka and
Yudhiṣṭhira had used the term. He highlighted the ethical transformation that Aśoka went
through after the Kalinga war that converted him from a conqueror to a Buddhist king.
He invoked the ethical dilemmas that Yudhiṣṭhira faced while wielding power, stressing
how Yudhiṣṭhira “named ānṛśaṃsya (literally, the opposite of being murderous) as the
highest type of normative compulsion (paramo dharmaḥ)” (Vajpeyi 63). Therefore
Gandhi was able to reignite a political tradition essentially by recalling it and readapting
it to the need of the time. He was able to show the relevance of “this Indic tradition,
which attempted to remove harm and the desire to harm (hiṃsā) altogether from the
equation between any two persons, (which) stood in contrast to the Western tradition as
defined by Machiavelli and Hobbes, where the social contract is premised on the capacity
for mutual harm held in check and traded for interests” (Vajpeyi 64).
Vajpeyi asserts that Ahimsa has three distinct semantic characteristics that yield
three distinct types of action: renunciation (sannyāsa), service (sevā) and normative
conduct in political life (dharma/dhamma). She argues that Gandhi’s brilliance “lies in
his ability to harness all three potential significations of ahimsa at once, to use it to
suggest the possibility of renunciative freedom, promote the ethic of social service, and
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hold up the ideal of a righteous republic” (Vajpeyi 64). It might seem counterintuitive but
Gandhi derives his concept of Ahimsa from the Bhagavad Gita, a discourse on the
necessity of fighting a war and performing one’s duty without much focus on the ultimate
consequences. Vajpeyi argues that this predicament lies in our understanding of Ahimsa
as “non-violence,” which confuses rather than clarifies the concept. According to Gandhi,
Ahimsa was required to tackle the moral problem of violence. He did not envision
Ahimsa generating passivity or creating people who meekly bear injustice and hide from
violence that is present both within themselves and around them. Instead he envisioned
the cultivation of Ahimsa as a mighty struggle in understanding violence and overcoming
its influence despite its prevalence in life. This is the primary meaning of Ahimsa that is
undermined by translating it only as “non-violence.”
In the Gita, “ahimsa in and of itself is neither prominent nor elaborated as a
category” (Vajpeyi 66), instead it is mentioned as one of many characteristics of an
ethical man. It is just a good quality to have like many others and therefore there would
be no explicit reason for a reader of the text to be attracted to the notion of “Ahimsa.”
Gandhi however understands Ahimsa differently as the core relationship between the self
and the other that one must master to win any battle. In the Gita, it is the moral dilemma
that Arjun is facing at the prospect of fighting his kin. For India it is the battle against the
colonial rule. Therefore for Gandhi Ahimsa is not just another value listed in the Gita, “it
is in fact the essence of the entire Gita, the text’s full import distilled into a single
category” (Vajpeyi 67). Without cultivating Ahimsa – the absence of a desire to explicitly
harm someone for the sake of harming them - Arjun cannot win the battle of Kurukshetra,
India cannot attain independence from the British and in-fact one cannot enter
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dharmakṣetra, “the very ground of normativity upon which ethical action unfolds in the
world” (Vajpeyi 68).
Vajpeyi goes onto make the argument that if the essence of Krishna’s message
was “niśkāma karma—action untainted by desire for its outcome—then ahimsa—
absence of the desire to harm—must equally qualify all of our dealings with others, even
our adversaries (and in some ways, most especially our adversaries)” (Vajpeyi 68).
Therefore ethical actions should avoid both being driven by desire, kāma or being driven
by blind violence, hiṃsā. Gandhi constructs political action, the politics of Swaraj,
around this understanding of Ahimsa. Therefore when Krishna describes a yogi of the
highest order as “one who regards all others equally, by analogy with himself, in both joy
and sorrow” (Vajpeyi 68) he is describing exactly what Gandhi understood by Ahimsa.
This is even more explicit when in chapter 11, verse 55 Krishna says, “O Pāṇḍava, one
who is devoid of ill-will towards other beings, he alone comes to me!” (Vajpeyi 68),
praising someone who is essentially following Gandhian Ahimsa. As Vajpeyi puts it
aptly:
Gandhi comes to the paradoxical conclusion that to put up a fight
in one’s right mind, with fearlessness, with clarity, with purpose and
concentration, without a desire to harm others but with the determination
to get beyond the here and now, this is ahimsa. If ill-intentioned or
thoughtless violence is hiṃsā, and paralyzed, cowardly non-violence is
glāni, then what Krishna is exhorting Arjuna to do, to pick up arms in a
courageous and conscientious manner, is, however counterintuitive it may
seem, ahimsa. (Vajpeyi 77)
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Other authors such as Mehta have suggested that Gandhi’s focus on ahimsa take
him outside the binary of war and peace in a Hobbesian political construct. Gita
according to Gandhi is not about war and violence but it’s about the training of the will to
cultivate ahimsa, an endeavor that everyone should consciously undertake. In-fact Mehta
goes onto argue that Gandhi’s thinking does not align with modern politics, not even
democracy, reflecting his radical anti-political thinking. Therefore Gandhi cannot
imagine freedom or self-rule in Britain’s parliamentary democracy. Gandhi believes:
(That) unless there is freedom from fear (abhaya), the achievement of true
non-violence (ahimsa), and the adherence to the truth (satyagraha), all
India can hope for is “English rule without the Englishman,” as Gandhi
writes in Hind Swaraj. This view is completely consistent with his reading
of the Gita, which is concerned neither with Kaurava victory nor Pāṇḍava
defeat, nor the death or survival of this or that hero or general, nor even
with the winning of the kingdom of Hastināpura, but with the clarification
of Arjuna’s will, the purification of his self, and its cleansing through the
dialogic process of self-examination under Krishna’s guidance. (Vajpeyi
79)
Conclusion
Gandhi is not just fighting for the political freedom of India; he is fighting for an
idea of India that believes in the complete liberation of the human mind and soul. He
does not just envision political freedom from the British in terms of political selfdetermination but he envisions a society where higher goals of human righteousness
(Dharma) are cherished. This according to him this is the goal of the Indic civilization.
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This is his idea of “Purna Swaraj” (Complete Self-Rule). To achieve this goal, Gandhi
believes in the cultivation of Ahimsa, which forms the crux of a society that values
righteousness and ethical behavior. Therefore for Gandhi, Swaraj is attained on the
bedrock of Ahimsa.

Rabindranath Tagore
Introduction
	
  
In the formation of Nation-States, certain poets have had a monumental role in
framing and communicating the values and vision of their nation. Walt Whitman was
declared America’s “poet of democracy”, Muhammed Iqbal was conferred the title of
Muffakir-e-Pakistan (ﻡمﻑفﮎکﺭر ﭖپﺍاﮎکﺱسﺕتﺍاﻥن, "The Thinker of Pakistan") and W.B Yeats was a
central figure in Irish nationalism. In a list of such nationalist poets, it would seem that
Rabindranath Tagore would be India’s natural choice. Considering how both India and
Bangladesh have adopted his songs as their national anthems, and how Tagore’s work has
had an immeasurable impact on Indian literature especially Bengali literature so much so
that one cannot imagine Bengali tradition without invoking Tagore, and how Tagore’s
Nobel award in Literature, the first by a non-European, has endeared him in national
consciousness, one cannot be blamed for putting Tagore in the same category as
Whitman, Iqbal, Yeats or even Bengal’s Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. This categorization
of Tagore however would be inaccurate.
Vajpeyi succinctly characterizes Tagore as “a national poet who does not believe
in the very form of the nation-state, and who is avowedly against nationalism in both of
its meanings—as the aspiration of subjugated peoples for political self-determination, and
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as the pride of already free nations in their nationality. He flatly opposes nationhood as
the telos of politics” (Vajpeyi 94). According to Vajpeyi, Tagore’s political significance
lies in his refusal to articulate poetry/art and nationalism with one another. She correctly
points out that “unlike Whitman, Rabindranath the poet does not sing democracy; unlike
Yeats, he does not sing the homeland; unlike Iqbal, he does not sing the nation of the
faithful. As an artist, unlike Abanindranath, he does not paint “Mother India.” We cannot
apply to him any of the usual monikers—he was not a cultural, religious, political, or
aesthetic nationalist” (Vajpeyi 92). Instead Tagore used categories such as samāj
(society), sāhitya (literature) and swadeshi (indigenous), which both etymologically and
philosophically, emphasized community, togetherness, and belonging. For Tagore there
was an important distinction between rashtra (nation) and samāj (society), with him being
more attracted towards the latter concept.
In this section I will point out that Tagore did not believe in a political identity as
conceptualized in the framework of a nation-state. In-fact he rejected western nationalism
declaring unequivocally that “neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism, nor
the fierce self-idolatry of nation-worship is the goal of human history” (Tagore v). Using
Tagore’s writings on Nationalism, I would argue that instead Tagore believed that
Indians derived their identity from the society, which “is a natural regulation of
relationships and the spontaneous self-expression of man as a social being” (Tagore v).
For Tagore samāj (society) had greater importance than the rashtra (nation). His
reasoning was based on his historical understanding of India as a “social civilization
founded on continual social adjustment” (Tagore v). In this regard Tagore believed in the
historical conception of India as a culture rather than in its new potential as a nation state.
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Vajpeyi describes this longing for the deep past by using the category of “viraha,”
Bengali/Sanskrit for the longing produced by a separation between lovers. Using his
work, especially his attachment to the Kalidasa’s Meghadūta, Vajpeyi argues that Tagore
was in love with the India of the past. I am arguing that Tagore’s conception of an Indian
identity is based on a social culture, and is derived from his “viraha” for the historical
past. This is very different than the conception that other thinkers have about identity. As
Vajpeyi puts it “an idea of India that resembles a separated lover for whom one longs in
perpetuity is very different from the idea of India as a nation-state, the object of political
desire, subject to political will, attainable through political action” (Vajpeyi 90).

Rashtra (Nation) vs. Samāj (Society)
	
  
In his lectures on Nationalism, Tagore famously declared that, “I am not against
one nation in particular, but against the general idea of all nations” (Tagore 97). For
Tagore “society is the expression of moral and spiritual aspirations of man which belong
to his higher nature” (Tagore 106). He argued that the idea of organizing people, who
work incessantly to increase the strength and efficiency of a larger mechanical system,
diverts “man’s energy from his higher nature where he is self-sacrificing and creative”
(Tagore 97), where he is moral. A man’s higher purpose of being a moral being might be
compromised for an inadequate goal of being a dutiful citizen. Tagore feels that by using
his power of sacrifice for a nation, a man might develop a false sense of moral exaltation
that can be extremely dangerous to the larger humanity. A nation is the creation of a
man’s intellect and does not necessarily encompass his entire moral personality. A man
can become dangerous to humanity by not critically scrutinizing the demands of his
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moral conscience when performing actions, and instead transferring that responsibility
onto this larger machine. Tagore eloquently illustrates this danger in the following
passage:
By this device (nationalism) the people which loves freedom perpetuates
slavery in a large portion of the world with the comfortable feeling of
pride of having done its duty; men who are naturally just can be cruelly
unjust both in their act and their thought, accompanied by a feeling that
they are helping the world in receiving its deserts; men who are honest can
blindly go on robbing others of their human rights for self
aggrandizement, all the while abusing the deprived for not deserving
better treatment (Tagore 98).
Tagore further argues that this Nationalism will not work for India because of its
unique history that bestows upon it a distinct problem; “the race problem.” Tagore
believes that European countries’ political and commercial character emerged from two
factors: their ethnically homogenous populations and their insufficient natural resources.
This allowed the people of each country to have fewer internal complications but more
external threats in the form of strong neighbors, keen on plundering their limited
resources. To tackle this issue they had to politically organize internally to be able to
commercially exploit their neighbors. He argues that this is the spirit with which the
countries of the West exploit the rest of the world through colonialism.
In contrast, India’s main concern is the social problem of accommodating
different races. According to Tagore, Indian civilization has been “seeking to find out
something common to all races, which will prove their real unity” (Tagore 93). Finding

	
  

	
  

53	
  
	
  
an answer to this problem is India’s mission. Tagore’s problem with Indian nationalism is
that it seeks a solution for a problem that is not necessarily India’s biggest concern,
ignoring India’s prime issue of social diversity. As Tagore states, “each nation must be
conscious of its mission and we, in India, must realize that we cut a poor figure when we
are trying to be political, simply because we have not yet been finally able to accomplish
what was set before us by our providence” (Tagore 86).
Tagore argues that there are two ways in which India has tried to address the race
problem in the past: spiritual unity and rigid social categorization. Tagore believes that
“no nation looking for a mere political or commercial basis of unity will find such a
solution sufficient. Men of thought and power will discover the spiritual unity, will
realize it, and preach it” (Tagore 94). According to Tagore only spiritual unity can
connect the various differences that manifest in human society. Recognizing and
accepting that there are various paths to happiness and that true happiness exists in
celebrating this diversity, is the only way to ensure harmony in a diverse society. Such
notions of spiritual unity were celebrated and preached throughout India through its
various saints such as Nanak, Kabir, Chaitanya and others who propagated the idea of
one God to all the races of India.
In terms of social categorization, Tagore uses the example of the caste system to
show how India used social institutions to stitch a spirit of toleration. According to him
the caste system has “produced something like a United States of a social federation,
whose common name is Hinduism” (Tagore 102). Through the caste system, India was
able to recognize the diversity of the races and the importance of maintaining those
differences. According to Tagore, where India failed was in its inability to realize that
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differences in human beings are not fixed like physical differences, but are instead fluid
and ever-changing. While recognizing differences provided stability, the inability to
recognize the change in differences deprived India of the opportunity to grow. Tagore
eloquently puts it as follows:

In trying to avoid collisions she (India) set up boundaries of immovable
walls, this giving to her numerous races the negative benefit of peace and
order but not the positive opportunity of expansion and movement. She
accepted nature where it produces diversity, but ignored it where it uses
that diversity for its world-game of infinite permutations and
combinations. She treated life in all truth where it is manifold, but insulted
it where it is ever moving. (Tagore 103)

An example of this is the manner in which India associated different trades and
professions with different castes, bringing the production of commodities under the law
of social adjustments. According to Tagore this had the positive impact of building
cooperation that satisfied the social needs of the people. However India’s rigid focus on
the law of hereditary and a loss of competition led to economic stagnation and a focus on
traditionalism. This, Tagore believes is the reason for India’s present helplessness against
the British. He very eloquently uses the metaphor of youth to show that the India’s rigid
social systems did not impede her development initially and that their ill effects were felt
only afterwards. Tagore points out that the negative effects of one’s bad habits are not felt
immediately especially when one is in vigor of their youth. It is only felt, once bad habits
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start consuming the vigor, setting in a gradual decline. Tagore says that, “India also in the
heyday of her youth could carry in her vital organs the dead weight of her social
organizations stiffened to rigid perfection, but it has been fatal to her, and has produced a
gradual paralysis of her living nature” (Tagore 111).
Tagore’s biggest concern about Indian nationalism is that it does not focus on
these old historical problems of India. According to him the educated Indian is trying to
adopt a European history which is not their own. He believes that the whole of East is
attempting to borrow a history, which is not the outcome of its own living. He feels that
the East is dazzled by the fireworks of the West, without realizing their temporary nature.
He very forcefully articulates his arguments here, urging his fellow Indians to follow
their own destiny:
In man’s history there come ages of fireworks which dazzle us by
their force and movement. They laugh not only at our modest household
lamps but also at the eternal stars. But let us not for that provocation be
precipitate in our desire to dismiss our lamps. Let us patiently bear our
present insult and realize that their fireworks have splendor but not
permanence, because of the extreme explosiveness which is the cause of
their power, and also of their exhaustion…. Anyhow our ideals have been
evolved through our own history and even if we wished we could only
make poor fireworks of them, because their materials are different from
yours, as is also their moral purpose…. The mistake that we make is in
thinking that man’s channel of greatness is only one -- the one which has
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made itself painfully evident for the time being by its depth of insolence.
(Tagore 96)
This disassociation with the past and the obsession with Western culture has the
negative impact of ignoring the historical problem of the Indian civilization. According to
Tagore, the majority of Indians believe that their ancient ancestors completed the
constructive work of creating a social and a spiritual ideal and that the social system
needs no more work. As he aptly writes about his countrymen:

We never dream of blaming our social inadequacy as the origin for our
present helplessness, for we have accepted as the creed of our nationalism
that this social system has been perfected for all time to come by our
ancestors who had the superhuman vision of all eternity, and supernatural
power for making infinite provision for future ages. (Tagore 108)

Therefore for Indians, the reason for their present decline and enslavement is not
their social inadequacy but a series of unfortunate historical events that allowed the
British to establish themselves in the subcontinent. Indians think that because their social
systems were already perfected, they should shift their energies into perfecting the
political system, taking their lessons from the West. Tagore thinks that this is delusional
and that one cannot “build a political miracle of freedom upon the quicksand of social
slavery”(Tagore 109). The weakness that exists in India’s social institutions will reappear
in its political institutions. One cannot hope to create just political institutions when
society itself has developed tyrannical practices. For Tagore moral freedom is more
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important than political freedom because the latter does not necessarily free our minds
from social tyranny. Tagore articulates this argument as follows:

The social habit of mind which impels us to make the life of our fellowbeings a burden to them where they differ from us even in such a thing as
their choice of food is sure to persist in our political organization and
result in creating engines of coercion to crush every rational difference
which is the sign of life. And tyranny will only add to the inevitable lies
and hypocrisy in our political life. Is the mere name of freedom so
valuable that we should be willing to sacrifice for its sake our moral
freedom? (Tagore 110)

Furthermore Tagore argues that India’s ancient problem is now the biggest
challenge confronting the whole world. India is many countries combined into one
geographical unit; the exact opposite of what Europe was, namely one unit divided into
many countries. In ancient times, it was easy to keep the geographical distinction in the
rest of the world. However due to technology, all races of men in the world have come in
closer contact. And now the question arises “whether the different groups of peoples shall
go on fighting with one another or find out some true basis of reconciliation and mutual
help; whether it will be interminable competition or cooperation” (Tagore 88). Tagore
argues that though man possesses self-love that leads to conflict, it is man’s higher
instincts of mutual help and sympathy that lead to the establishment of civilization. He
believes that the organization of Nationalism that thrives on conflict and competition will
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not help solve the world’s present problem. It will be solved only if the world follows its
higher nature of spiritual unity and common humanity. Tagore believes that “there is a
future before us and that future is waiting for those who are rich in moral ideals and not
in mere things” (Tagore 96).
Therefore for Tagore, India’s quest for social stability gains more importance
because of its potential impact on the world. If India, in its delusional nationalistic
jingoism, fails to first solve the race problem and focuses instead on creating political
organization, not only will it create an unjust society based on tyrannical social principles
but it will also miss an opportunity to fulfill its moral purpose and contribute to the
greater good of humanity. As Tagore succinctly summarizes India’s purpose:
In finding the solution of our problem we shall have helped to
solve the world problem as well. What India has been, the whole world is
now. The whole world is becoming one country through scientific facility.
And the moment is arriving when you also must find a basis of unity
which is not political. If India can offer to the world her solution, it will be
a contribution to humanity. There is only one history- the history of man.
All national histories are merely chapters in the larger one. And we are
content in India to suffer for such a great cause. (Tagore 87)

Conclusion
	
  
For Tagore, the future of India has to account for its historical problem. India has
to refocus on the “samāj” (society) instead of chasing its new obsession with the
“rashtra”(nation). This longing for the renovated past that addresses its social
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inadequacies but remains fluid in its understanding of life, for an India abounding with
creative and spiritual energy, is perfectly encapsulated in Tagore’s viraha as described by
Vajpeyi in her analysis of Tagore’s literary work. Tagore longs for an “India, of about
fifty centuries at least, who tried to live peacefully and think deeply, the India devoid of
all politics, the India of no nations, whose one ambition has been to know this world as of
soul, to live here every moment of her life in the meek spirit of adoration, in the glad
consciousness of an eternal and personal relationship with it” (Tagore 6). Furthermore in
a world connected through technology and commerce, Tagore’s idea of samāj (society)
expands to include not just the Indian-subcontinent but also the rest of humanity. For
Tagore world society will progress if it does not engage in conflict fostered by narrow
self-interest and national love, but instead focuses on man’s higher nature of cooperation
and mutual respect. India’s mission, according to Tagore is to be the epitome of this
higher nature despite the allure of West’s transient prosperity. Only by following this
path, will India fulfill its destiny and contribute to the world samāj (society).
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Chapter 4- The Beginning
In this brief chapter I will show an application of Sen’s Open Impartiality
approach by analyzing themes that are shared by both Gandhi and Tagore in the previous
chapter. I am not claiming that the end result will be comprehensive or even completely
accurate. It is a thought-experiment with many potential solutions based on different
readings of the founders. In an ideal world, Sen’s approach would be best conducted
using the tool of public reasoning and discussion. Therefore in that case, Tagore and
Gandhi would engage in open dialogue and seek to establish common grounds of
understanding. In the present scenario it is impossible to conduct or accurately capture
that process of engagement. Therefore for the purpose of this paper I am seeking on
capturing certain aspects of the common ground that could be established between these
visionaries. The aim of this common ground is not to be all-inclusive and completely
precise, but rather to be illuminating enough to provide a starting point for Indians to start
a larger conversation. Therefore the exercise is conducted to highlight the potential that
Sen’s approach can have. I will conclude by stressing the meaning and the importance of
an inclusive approach like the Open Impartiality approach, and by using the common
ground established by Tagore and Gandhi as the method to provoke a deeper engagement
to address India’s present predicaments.

Gandhi and Tagore: Common Ground
The purpose of this section is to create a scenario where Sen’s Open Impartiality
approach can be applied to find some common ground between different views. In this
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case I am using the views of two founders of India, who had different visions of India to
see what they agreed on when they envisioned Indian identity. The question is: what were
some views which both Gandhi and Tagore shared when they thought about being
Indian?
First, for our purpose it is interesting to note that both these founders rejected the
nation as the end goal, as the telos for India’s political liberation. While Tagore was more
outspoken about his contempt for nationalism, even Gandhi was skeptical of the
bureaucratic and institutionalized nation state. For both of them the upliftment of the
Samāj or the broader society was the end goal of India’s fight for liberation. The Samāj
and not the Rashtra was the focus for “Purna Swaraj” (Complete Self-Rule). Therefore
creating the nation-state of India from British India was not the end vision of these
founders.
Second, they put a lot of focus on the growth and development of the individual.
Gandhi’s emphasis on Ahimsa was based on self-cultivation and self-control of the ideals
of non-violence as espoused in the Gita. While it seems Tagore focuses exclusively on
Samāj, he recognizes the diversity present in human nature, acknowledging the
importance of each individuals. For both of them to liberate Samāj, individuals have to be
given the freedom to cultivate certain qualities and liberate themselves.
Third, both of them shared similar ideas of what these qualities were that needed
to be cultivated in individuals for their liberation. Both of them attached an ethical and a
spiritual connotation to the qualities that individuals were to develop. They completely
rejected Western notions of self-love, arguing for the growth of higher human instincts of
sympathy and mutual cooperation. While Tagore whole-heartedly believed in Ahimsa,
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Gandhi was a proponent of the spiritual unity of all human beings. Both believed that the
spiritual liberation of the individual would lead to the liberation of society.
Fourth, both derived their visions from India’s past. They used terms that were
available in Indic philosophy and reinvented them to rejuvenate a population uncertain of
its own heritage. They also vehemently opposed many Western concepts, especially the
ones that they felt were harming people by promoting colonization all over the world. In
their rejection of Western ideas, however they are unanimous in accepting the shared
humanity of the people of the West and leaving room for incorporating the good from
Western tradition. Their main focus though is still the Indic thought from where they
derive their core philosophies.
Lastly both the founders are exceptional in their vision of India because they
imagine an inclusive India. Their vision makes room for India’s diversity and indeed
promotes it as an important goal for a just Indian society. This focus on incorporating
diversity and providing a potential solution for India’s race problem is powerful and
makes these visionaries exceptional.

The Conclusion: the “Righteous Republic”
I want to conclude this paper by reiterating the crisis that the Indian state is
experiencing. India’s democracy, due to its diverse social character and its inability to
reconcile this diversity, is being held hostage to vested interests. It has developed into the
most primitive form of democracy, a tyranny of majority rule where strength lies purely
in numbers. India is considered the largest democracy in the world, but that is simply
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because it conducts the largest ballot exercise in the world. This niti-centered approach of
democracy that focuses on organizational institutions is neither complete nor sufficient
for the effective and just conduct of a true democracy.
Democracy in its true form also incorporates the idea of public reasoning and
discussion. John Stuart Mills famously proclaimed that a true democracy is a
“government by discussion” (Sen 326). India in its present form is not able to provide a
common political platform for its different people to engage in meaningful public
discussion. The institutions that India has set up to facilitate deliberation are being abused
by various interest groups with their own particular agendas. Therefore India needs to
find a way to establish a platform that is not handicapped by India’s inherent social
diversity. Sen provides us with a potential solution through his Open Impartiality
approach. His approach not only facilitates deliberation but it provides a common
political platform by incorporating the differences in various social groups. Therefore
social diversity becomes an asset instead of a liability in fostering meaningful discussion
in Sen’s model.
Sen’s model, however could potentially be hard to initiate. For that purpose I have
attempted to apply the model to find some initial common ground in the vision that
India’s founders envisioned. This common vision, while not comprehensive, seeks to
provide an initial start that can provoke a larger application of Sen’s Open Impartiality
approach. The theme that is shared by the founders revolves around how they envisioned
India’s place in the world as the moral compass of the globe, as the “Righteous
Republic.” Ananya Vajpeyi describes this shared vision as follows:
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The righteous republic is a separate place, a repository of certain norms
and values whose traces we may find even today in postcolonial India—
norms and values without which it becomes impossible to either establish
India’s distinct historical identity in the world or justify its abiding claim
to moral authority in the global community… (The founders) created the
ground upon which India stands—a solid plinth of moral selfhood and
ethical sovereignty, absent which India is nothing more than the token of a
type, a nation among nations, with no special contribution to human
history. (Vajpeyi 10)

This shared vision can perhaps provide the tools to begin the engagement between
the various communities in India. It can be used to address the potential crisis that is
brewing in the country. If no action is taken then soon India would disintegrate into
various smaller nations. This will deprive India not only of the opportunity to achieve its
destiny but also the chance to contribute to greater humanity. It will deprive India of
being the Righteous Republic. Sen proposes a solution that if based on the vision of
Indian founders, can potentially avert this tragedy.
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